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Abstract
This  study  investigates  credit  card  holding  and the  household
demands for  several  ftonetary  assets  in  a  simultaneous  equations
fraftework.  It  exploits  the  detailed  data  on household  assetsr  as  well
as  demographic  and preference  characteristics  in  the  1983 Survey  of
Consumer finances.  A key  findingr  is  t,hat,  consistent  with  theory'  a
higher  probability  of  credit  card  ownership  implies  lower  demand for
liquid  money balances  with  no effect  on  snall  time  deposit  balancea.
JEL Classification  Codes:  EAI,  E50, DfzOver  the  past  two  decades,  the  use  of  credit  cards  in  the
United  States  has  increased  dramatically,  as  reflected  in  the  level  of
credit  card  debt  and  the  proportion  of  t,he  population  with  credit
cards.'  Nevertheless.  there  have been  few  enpirical  studies  of  the
effect  of.. credit  cards  on money demand,.  Using  the  1970 Survey  of
Consuner Finances  (SCf) ,  I4andell  (1972)  found  that  farniliee  with  credj-t
catds  had  smaller  demand deposit  balances  than  those  without,  but  that
tbe  difference  was atatistically  insj.gnificant.  using  data  from  one
bank,  White  (1975)  found  evidence  that  credit  card  usage had  a
statlstica]Iy  eignificant  effect  on household  demand deposit  balances.
There  are  sorne  empirical  problems,  however,  with  these  cross-
sectional  studj-es.  First,  at  the  time  of  these  a  d  other  published
cross-sectionaf  studies  of  money  dernand  (e,9.,  Feige  (1964, 1974) and
I"ee  (1956)  )  were  undertaken,  empiri-caI  methods vref,e  not  yet  developed  to
handle  the  self-selection  bias  lhat  arises  when only  deposit  owners  are
sampled and the  potential  for  simultaneity  bias  if  credit  card  ownership
depends on money demattd.  Second,  neither  study  controlled  for  the
j$pact.  of  lrealth  or  total  assetg  on money  denand  (Mandel  did  not  use
sueh variables  and White's  data  set  did  not  include  them),  Furthefl  o!e,
nhite's  data  set  did  not  include  infornation  on the  total  holdings  of
denand deposits  of  account  holders  at  all  depositories,  Finally,
white's  findings  may be  skewed toward  reflectinq  che behavior  of  higher
income households,  since  he had no  data  on balances  at  thrift
institutions,  where  lower  income  households  tended  to  have  deposits.
1.  From yearend L969 to  yearend 1989, revolving  consumer  credit
outstanding,  deflated  by  the  PCE  deflator,  grew  about  1600t.  Over  the
shorter  period  L977 and 1983, credit  card  ownership increased  from  62.9t
to  67,6*  of  surveyed households in  the  19?7 and 1983 SCFg, respectively,-2-
The current  study  addresses  these  deficiencies  using  newer
empiiical  techniques  developed  since  these  earlier  studies  alongr with
data  on opportunity  costs,  household  balances  at  all  depositoriesr  and
household  asset  holdings,  To avoid  selectivity  and  simultaneity  biases,
a multi-stage  .estimation  procedure  .is- ernployed.  :In -the  first  steP,
probil  models  of  deposit  account  and credit  card  ovrnership  are
estimated,  A non-zero  covariance  of  the  probit  and money demand etrors
indicates  that  a two-stage  approach  is  necesaary  to  obtaj"n  consistent
parameter  estimateB.  In  the  second  stage,  constructed  variableg  from
the  account  probits  are  used to  correct  money demand regressions  for
selectiTity  bias,  and the  estimated  probability  of  card  ownership  is
used  as  an  ingtrument  for  card  ownership,
The study  contributes  to  literature  on money demand in  other
ways.  There  have been  few  croes-sectional  studies  of  money demand, and
the  data  sets  available  to  earlier  researchers  (e.9.,  Feige  (1964t L9'14't
and Lee  (1966))  did  not  have the  extensive  denographic  and prefelence
inforrEtion  available  on the  1983 ScF.  controlling  for  theee  additional
infl-uences,  the  current  study  conducts  cross-sectional  tests  of  income
and assets  as  scale  variables--an  issue  which  Feige  and  Lee were  unable
to  addreas.  Furthermore,  in  contrast  to  previous  studies,  thj-s  paper
uses  cross-sectional  data  after  the  deregulation  of  most  deposit
interest  ratesr  and after  an explosive  period  of  growth  of  both  credit
cards  and of  new liquid  financial  instrunents  for  households.
This  study  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  l- begins  with  a
brief  theoretical  discussion,  The second section  presents  the-3-
estination  method and  Section  3 discusses  the  data.  Results  are
reviewed  in  Section  4,  and the  final  section  presents  concLusions.
l.  Credit  Cards  and Money Balances  in  Theory
The...ensuj-ng empir.ical  .analy€is  -couId  be  related  to  an  infinite
horizon  problem  in  which  households  maximize  the  utiJ.ity  of  ]ifetime
consumption,  subject  to  the  constraint  that  a medium of  exchange mugt. be
used  to  compLete any txansaction.  Payment media  are  currencyr  checkst
or  credit  cards,  each  of  rrhich  has  different  transaction  costs  acroEs
goods purchases.2  In  addition,  transaction  costs  are  incurred  j.n
transferring  funds  among various  monetary  components and  other  financial
The model  would  be  enriched,  though  likely  nade  intractable,  by
incorporating  institutional  constlaints  related  to  particular  trans-
actions  (nhich  night  be tj:ne-varying).  For  instance,  eertain  tl?es  of
transactions  may require  payment with  currency  ,  while  others  nay
require  checks.  AIso,  a  three-check  per  month  limit  may apply  to  money
fund  accounts.
The costs  and benefits  of  account  or  credit  card  onnership.  and
lhe  optlnal  bafances  in  the  various  account  types,  thus  depend on the
structures  of  transaction  costs,  institutional  restrictions,  and
relative  interest  rates.  Iiquidity  constraints  related  to  imperfect
capital-  marketa  nay  also  affect  who owns credit  cards.  The decision  to
own an account  or  credit  card  'rould  of  course  involve  comparinq  the
-t 
wnitesett  (L990) develops a theoretical  model with  a  simpJ-ified
structure  of  trangaction  costs  in  which  consuners  minimize  the  sum of
transaction  and holding  costs  across  these  three  media  of  exchange.-4-
discounted  net  benefit  of  prospective  use with  the  fixed  cost  of
obtai-ning  the  card  or  account.  The terms  of  offer  of  credlt  cards  and
account  facilities  by  retaj-lers  and banks  coufd  also  be  important  to
ftodel,  particularly  in  the  presence  of  local  market  power,
As SoiLted  out  hy.Ma.rcus  (1960)",.and  trhite  (f975) |  the  effect  of
credit  cards  on transaction  balances  may be  ambiguous.  Credit  card
ownership  could  be  associaled  with  sEalle!  checking  account  balances  for
the  followi-ng  reasons:
{1}  A credit  caxd  owner  likely  holds  lower  precautionary  money balances
to  the  extent,  that  the  card  can be  used  for  emergency pal'ments.
(2)  while  awaiting  the  credit  card  bill,  funds  could  be  held  in  an asset
earning  higher  returns  than  a  checking  accounl ,
(3)  CardhoJ-ders rnay synchronize  payments  so that  the  card  bill  is  paid
shortl-y  after  receiving  a paycheck.
Alsof  cuLhbertson  (L985,  p,  208)  mentions  that  credit  cards  may reduce
transactions  balances  by  providing  a  trbuffer  stock"  of  liquidity.
On the  other  hand,  credit  card  ownership  could  be  associated
with  lafger  checking  account  baJ-ances for  the  following  reasons:
(1)  Reduced vrithdfavrals  of  currency  from  checking  accounts  may occur  if
credil  cards  substj-tute  for  currency.
(2)  When cards  substj-tute  for  checks,  funds  may stay  idle  in  the
checking  account  for  a  longer  time,  awaiting  the  credit  card  bill.
Transaction  costs  may eliminate  potential  profits  fron  shifting
temporarily  idle  funds  to  assets  with  higher  reLurns.
(3)  Card ownershi,p nay  reveal  a  higher  propensity  to  consune out  of
income  and wealth.  Apparently,  this  effect  has  not  been mentioned-5-
previously  j.n the  literature.  It  is  particularly  relevant  for  cross-
€ection  studies  with  incone  or  wealth  proxying  for  epending  leve1s.
The pxopensicy-to-consume  effect  can be  illustrated  sinply  by
adopting  a  Etandard  assunption  that  credit  cards  offer  a  net  variabfe
benefiL  of ..1"b1  per-dollar  when.  co:npared^with. ohecksf  but- only  npr
percent.  of  spending  is  with  merchants  who accept  cards.  Usj-ng a  sinqrle-
period  analysis,  a  household  will  obtain  a  credit  card  if  the  fixed  cost
of  owning  itr  q,  is  less  than  the  total  benefit,  bpcY,  where  c  is  the
Propensity  to  consume out  of  permanent  income,  Y.  SupPose income  is
constant  across  a population,  but  different  preferencea  lead  to  two
subpopul,ations  with  propensities  t.o consume, c1  and  cZ,  where:
c^ > J-  > c-.
Z  DPI  I
Group 2  therefore  owns credit  cards,  while  qroup  1-  does  not.  If  no
funds  are  held  in  checking  accounta  to  pay  credit  card  debts,  total
check  spending  and thus,  checking  account  balances,  of  the  cardholding
group  are  nevertheless  larger  than  the  balances  of  the  non-card  groupt
ceteris  paribus,  if  (1-p)c.Y  > c.Y,  or  if:
>  :-.
"1 
r  -  P
The percentage  difference  in  propensities  to  consume must  be  J.arger  than
the  ratio  of  card  to  check  spending  for  this  effect  to  induce  a  positive
correlation  between  card  ownership  and  checkino  account  balances.
In  a  Baumol-Tobj-n  money demand franework  similar  to  that  of
Akhand and Milbourne  (1986),  card  ownershj-p woul.d not  affect  the  income-6-
or  interest  elasticity  of  the  demand.  for  money of  individuals.3
Rather,  using  the  above  fra$ework  in  a  regression  of  the  1og of  money
defland.  the  constant  term  of  the  cardholder  group  would  differ  from  that
of  the  nonqard  group  by:
I -  i trog  (  {1-P)  c2) -.los(ci)1.
2.  Estimation  Method
The structural  model enployed in  this  study  is:
M* = X1Pl + ul,
M  = X^B^  + u^,  and
I  z'z  z
Card*=X3F3*o3,
where the  p.  are  parameter matrices.  M* is  a vector  of  latent  variables '.L
representing  the  desired  levels  of  various  monetary  componentsr  and
Card*  is  a  latent  variable  for  credit  card  ownership.  The u.  follow  a
joj-nt  normal  distribution  wj-th  covariance  rnatrix:
lo".  o.^ o"  "l I  fr  lz  rJl
r = lo".  o"o  0 l.
I  LL  I
Lo,,  o  oarJ
Furthermore,  it  is  assumed that  u,  is  a  standard  normal  variable
(o3 =  t),  The reason  is  that  the  Card*  equatj-on  is  estimated  wj-th  a
probit  model,  which  can only  estimate  the  ratio,  F3lor,  and o,  =  1  is
the  usual- normalization.
Mr  i-s a matrix  of  reservation  money balances  across  households
and account  types.  14, is  defined  to  be the  level  of  deposits  at  which  a
3-  Although  the  Akhand and MiLbourne  (1986)  model  implies  this  result
for  individuals.  they  stress  that  credit  card  use affects  the  interest
and  income elasticities  of  total  money demand  when they  aggregate  across
card  and noncard  holders  using  an agsumed density  function  for  incorne.-7-
household's  net  benefit  f.rom account  services  jusl  equals  the  fixed  cost
of  establishing  an  account,  Actual  deposit  balances,  M,  is  a  censored
variable  gince  we observe  M = M* if  M* 2  Mrr  but  M =  0 otherwise.  Of
coursef  Mr  is  also  unobserved,
.,.In--addition,.  Card*  is  unobserved,  but  Lhe di.chotornous variable
Card  is  observed  (and is  a  conrponent of  X.),  where:
Card=lifCard*)0,
indicat.ing  credit  card  ownership,  and Card =  0 otherwise.  The
condition,  Card*  >  0,  is  equivalent  to  u3 t  -  *gF:.  Credit  card
ownership  affects  Lhe  desired  level  of  money bal-ances,  but  not  the
t.hreshold  level  required  for  deposit  account  ownership.
The esLimation  of  this  model  is  compJ.icated by  selectivity  and
simultaneity  problems.  Selectivity  bias  axises  because money holdings
are  observed  only  for  householdB  who have  accounts,  A  sample  restricted
to  account  owners  is  biased  since  E(urlM*  > Mr)  +  0.  Including  non-
account-owners  is  inappropriate,  since  their  desired  rnoney holdings  are
are  less  than  their  reservation  levef,  Mr,  but  not  necessarily  zeto.
The standard  tvro-step  procedure  that  is  used  to  correct  for  selectivity
bias  is  as  fol-Iows  [see,  e,9,,  lleckman (1.979]  or  tee  (1982)1,
First,  let  A be  a matrix  of  dununy  variables,  with  an  entry  of
one  if  a  household  has  a  particular  type  of  account.  Then,  defj-ne  the
following  variables:
-  x1Fl  - x2P2  u2-ur  2  z  z z,'l  = --=-;-,  ,. = --;-,  and  o- = Var(u2  -  ur) = ci+  oi-  2or2.
Account  ownership  is  then  equivalent  to  the  fo]lowing  events:
A=1r  M* lM-,  and  u3zT.-8-
Defining  the  latent  variablesf  A)t s M* -  Mrr  i  probit  model for  account
ownership could  estinate  i.  For each household, it  woutd then be
possible  to  compute  the  hazard rate  or  inverse  lilill  rat io'  EGp,  where
aft\l
S  j-s the  standard  normal  distribution  function,  and  0  is  the  density.
Subtracting  this  hazard  rate  from  u,  leaves  zerolnean  errors.
In  this  case,  however,  the  above procedure  has  to  be nodified
because  of  the  presence  of  two  types  of  sirnultaneity  bi-as  along  with
selectivity  bias,  Because ownership  of  a transaction  account  may be
required  for  credit  card  ownership,  the  endogenous variable  A is  a
conponent  of  X3.  Furthermore,  ownership  of  a  credit  card  affects
desired  money holdings.  Because the  endogenous variable  Card  is  a
component of  X1f  it  is  also  a  component of  2.4
The probit  equations  for  card  and account  ownership  are
estjlnated  as  a block,  since  money holdings  do not  enter  as  explanatory
variables  in  that  bi-variate  svstem.s  Instrrrnents  for  Card  and
transaction  account  ownership'  that  enter  into  regressions  of  money
balances  are  estimated  by  probit  regressions  involving  all  exogenous
variables.  Money balances  do not  enter  into  the  Card probit,  and the
Card/Money equation  systern is  therefore  recursive,  Nev€rtheless,
simultaneity  bias  arises  because the  Card probit  and the  money equation
4.  The ptesence  of  both  dichotomous  variables  in  a  bivariate  latent
variable  model  leads  to  a rdell-known  logical  inconsistency  [e.q.,  see
Maddala (1983),  page 3"1.91  ,  However, in  this  case,  Card is  insignificant
in  the  account  probit  equation,  impfying  no  inconsistency.
5.  Probit  estination  was undertaken  with  the  GQOPT4/I  nonlinear
optindzatj-on  package  (version  4,03),  developed  by  GoldfeJ-d and Quandt,
?o  ensure  convergence.  a  nurnber of  optinization  algorithms  were
employed,  including  GRADX  (see Goldfeld  and Quandt  (L972ll  I  POWELL  (see
Po$e1! (1964)  ),  and DFP (see Powell  {1971)  )  .
6.  Defined  as  owning  a  checking  or  a money fund/MMDA  accountf  or  both.errors  are  correlated  (o13 *  0).?  This  correlation  could  reflect  the
existence  of  o[ritted  and unobserved  household  preference  variables  tha!
help  explain  both  rnoney holdings  and  card  ownership.  For  instancer  a
higher  propensity  to  consume out  of  income  or  weal-th  could  Lead to  both
larger  noney Jroldinge  and..a.greater-"propensi,ty  to  obtai"n-a  credit  card.
The standard  two-step  correction  for  simultaneity  bias  of  this
nature  is  to  substitute  the  estimated  probability  of  card  ownership  for
the  credit  card  dumny variables  in  the  money regressions.  The final
money dernand  equations  are  then  estimated  by  OLS, after  making  this
subslitution,  and after  including  the  appropriate  hazard  rate  to  correct
for  sirnullaneity  bias.  The resulting  covariance  matrix  of  the
esti$ators  is  very  complicated,  but  the  slandard  errors  in  such models
can be consistently  estimated  using  white'e  (1980) coffection  for
het,erosked.asticity,  I
The final  equations  for  money components must  be  considered
send*reduced  forms,  because  interdependence  among balances  held  in
different  types  of  accounts  is  ignored.  Because the  data  set  is
unlikely  to  yield  good predictions  of  the  precise  structure  of  holdings
among  moneta.ry components,  a two  stage  least  squares  procedure  is  not
employed  f,or  the  money runa.  Insteadf  equations  for  various  aggregateg
are  estjr8ated,  including  transaction  balances  (checking  and money
fundsllaMDAs),  nontransactions  deposits  (savings  and CDs),  liquid
-7llEG-Eorrelation 
was found  by  constructj-ng  a  hazard  rate  for  the
Card  variable,  and adding  it  to  the  error  tern  in  the  money demand
equations.  Then regressions  using  data  only  from  Cardowners  give  an
eslimate  of  o.,.  from  the  coefficient  on the  Card  hazard  rate.
8-  Intuitivelf,  the  use  of  estimated  expJ-anatory  variables  (and an
errcr  term  whose variance  depends on the  hazard  rate)  does  not  result  in
nonzero  covariances  of  errors  arnong  households.  Because the  error
covariance  matrix  remains  diaqonal,  lihite's  estimator  is  consistent.The nain  data  aource  for  this  studv  is  the  cleaned  and
vetsion  of  the  L983 Survey  of  Consumer Finances  (SCF) produced
-10-
baLances  (checkingr,  noney  funds/MMDAs, and  savinge) '  and all  conponenta
combj-ned (called  household  M2 deposits)  .  Each of  these  aggregations
internalizes  substitution  acnoss  accounts  with  some similar  features.
In  principler  one  could  estimate  the  entire  system  of  equations
with  naximum.-]-ikeLihood..,techniques,-  This -technj-que nas  not'employed,
however,  due to  the  coftputational  difficulty  of  evaluating  rnultiple
integrals  for  each  iteration  of  the  likelihood  function.
3.  Data  and  variabfes
Federal  Reserve Board staff  (see Avery and Elliehausen  (1988))




households  is  usedl  excluding  any  observations  with  relevant  missing
vari-ables  and households  with  zero  asseta  or  i-ncome. 
to 
Given  the
availability  of  data  in  the  1983 gCFr four  individual  deposit  cotttponents
were  estinated:  checking,  passbook-type  savings,  money market  mut,ual
funds  (MMMFS  )  plus  MMDAS,  and  emalt  ti:ne  deposits.lr  MMDAg  and MMMFE
were  cornbined because the  introduction  of  MMDAS  in  late  1,982  and early
1983  induced  households  to  svritch  from  MI"ftlFs  to  !4I'{MDAg,  and  most
households in  the  1983 scF wer€ interviewed  during  this  peri.od. In
9.  The 1986 SCF was not  used because  its  data  were  not  as  disaggregated
by  type  of  account.  Indeed,  savings  and ehecking  accounts  are  lunped
together,  as  are  srnall  tjfie  and MMDA,/MMMF  accounts;  in  each  caae,  a
deposit  with  transactions  features  is  combined with  a  savings  vehicle.
10,  308 households  from  the  representative  sample were  dropped  under
these  two  criteria.  Households  with  zero  income or  asseLs  were  excluded
because  log-Ij-near  money demand specifications  were  used,
A.lso note  that  the  impact  of  credit  cards  on deposit  holdings  was noL
sensitive  to  outliers;  resultg  $ere  quatilatively  similar  in  runs  ldhich
excluded  households  wi-th  income  or  assets  of  $1 million  or  more.
11.  Data  on  currency  holdings  were  not  collected  on the  SCF.-  11-
addition,  as mentioned  in  the  preceding  section,  four  aggrregations  of
these  components vfere investigated.
In  addition  to  deleminants  of  money dernandr variables
reflecting  the  supply  and demand for  credit  cards  were  included  in  the
reduced  fors'  probit  .  models.,  of  credil  .card  and .account 'ownershlp,  A
hous€hcld  was classified  as  having  a  credit  card  if  it  had a  retail
(noflgasoline)  credit  card  or  a  general  credit/travel  card  (e.g.r  visa,
Mastercard,  or  Anerican  Expressl .12
3a.  Money Demand.  vatiabJ"es
A variety  of  independent  variables,  including  measures of
pref,erences,  were  used to  assess  the  relevance  of  different  theories  of
money demand.  These variables  fall  into  fouf,  categories:  opportunity
cost.  scale/employment I  precautionary/  savinqs  denandr  and demographic.
ScalelEmployment  Variables
According  to  the  transactions  approach  to  money demand, Lhe
appropriate  scale  variable  is  a  proxy  for  transactions,  whereas port-
fol-io  theorj.es  inpfy  that  wealth  should  be used  instead.  Straddling
these  two  approaches,  friedman  (1956)  enphasizes  that  human and nonhuman
wealth  Cetermine  the  demand for  money,  Two dj-fferent  scale  variables
were tried:  the  logs  of  total  assets  (LASSETS)  and total  household
i-ncorne (LINCOME). 13 
Household  income  includes  inlerest  and  realized
12.  Gasoline  or  aj-rline  t,ravel  cards  were  not  counted  as  credit  cards,
in  pa.rt  because they  are  much poorer  substitutes  for  deposits.  Gasoline
cards  lre.re a.Iso treated  this  way because they  mainly  affect  the  use  of
currency  and  currency  data  were  not  collected  in  the  1983 SCF,
L3.  In  principle,  petmanent  j-ncone pro:ries  could  be  constructed  for  sorne
households  using  incorne data  from  the  L986 SCF over  the  period  1983-
1985.  Howeverr doing  this  reduces  the  sample by  one-third,  since  many
(FootnoLe  continued  on next  page.)capital  gains  on  assets.  Regressions  also  included  dununies refJ.ecting
whether  the  household  head was a  student  not  currentl.y  enployed
(STL:DENT),  alld  whether  the  househo].d head nas  unemployed but  neither
retired  nor  a  student  (UNEMPLOY)  --both  equal  L  if  yes,
Opporlunity  Cost  variab.l-es..
rn  this  crosg-sectional  studyl  obgervable  variation  in
opportunity  costs  arises  from  variation  across  t irne resulting  from
different  intervi-ew  dates  (ranging  frorn February  to  August) '  Sifiilar  to
Moore,  Porterr  and Smal}  (1990),  opportunity  cost  measures r,rere defined
as  the  difference  between the  three-month  Treasury  bill  rate  and the
own-raue  on the  relevaut  monetary  variable  (oWNCOST)  .  A weighted-
average  opportunity  cost  for  MMDAS  and  MMMFS  was  conputed.  using
national  quantiti€s  to  caLculate  weights  for  each month.  A  similar
weigrhted-average  opportunj.ty  cost  for  checking  accounts  waa computed.
using  the  ratio  of  ocDs to  household  denand deposits,  Household  demand
deposits  were  irnputed  by  applying  the  proportion  of  individual  to  total
derund  deposj.ts  from  the  nationaJ"  Denand Deposit  Ownership  Survey  to
deraand  deposits  (not  seaeonally  adjusted).  weighted  averages  of
opportuniLy  coats  vrere again  computed for  transactiong,  nontransactions.
and household  M2 deposlts.  Because of  lags  in  the  response  of  money
denand to  interest  rate  changes,  three-month  moving  averages  of
(Foot.not.e is  continued  from  previous  page,)
households  on the  earLier  panel  could  not  be  contacted  for  the  1986
panel,  and the  sample  frorn  1986 is  prone  to  selection  bias  because  it
was easier  to  find  homeowners who answered the  1983 sample than  renters.
The log  of  net  worth  was not  used  as  a  scale  variable  because  a  good
poriion  of  the  sample had  zero  or  negative  net  worth.  By contrast,  only
3*  of  households  had  zero  assets,  In  runs  not  reported,  the  qualitative
results  with  respect  to  credit  cards  and money balances  were  similar
when net  wealth  r,ras  used  in  place  of  assets  in  a more  restricted  sarnple.-13-
opportunity  costs  were  uaed in  the  regressions,  using  data  over  the
three  months  ending  just  prior  to  the  month of  the  interview.
Unfortunately,  the  estimates  of  the  opportunily  cost
elasticities  that  are  obtained  here  are  not  really  meaningful  for  two
reasofis.  Lirst. r -opportunity  -.coat  s -only-vary  ov€r.the  .short  time  period
over  lqhich  interviews  were  conducted.  Second,  this  problem  is  cofirpound-
ed by  tjre  series  evidence  that  there  are  lags  in  the  adjustment  of
money balances  to  changes in  opportunit,y  coats,  Thus,  including  oppor-
tunity  cost  terms  in  this  study  only  serves  Lhe purpose  of  minimizing
any  omitted  variable  bias  effects  on other  estlnated  coefficients.
Precautionary  Demand/Savings Variables
Miller-Orr  (1966)  models  of  money demand irnply  that  grealer
varialion  in  income or  expenditures  induces  households  to  hold  more
noney  balances.l4  To control  for  variation  in  such  factors  across
households,  several  dumqr variables  were  j-nc1uded.  One indicated
**hether  the  household  could  rely  on  fanily  of  friende  for  emergency
funds  (EMER)  r  and the  other,  whether  medical  expenses  were  one of  the
households'  two  most  important  reasons  for  saving  (SAVMED),  both  coded
a.5 1  if  yes.  Two preference  dunmies were  included  to  control  for
differences  in  risk  aversion.  The first  reflected  whether  the  family
would  take  any  risk  in  investing  its  savings  in  exchange  for  above
average  returns  (AVERSE=I  if  no).  The second  indicated  whether  the
household  was willing  to  tie  up  funds  for  a  period  of  tine  in  exchange
for  above average  returns  (ILLIQ=1  if  no) .  Precautionary  theories  and
14.  The l"liller-Orr  model  implies  that  the  variability  of  net  cash  out-
flows  (expenditures  less  income)  increases  the  demand for  money and to
qrreater extent  as the  cost  of  shortfalls  (i.e,,  the  disutility)  rj-ses.-L4-
inventory  models  including  preference  Feightings  on  funding  sholtfalIs
suggest  that  faniLies  that  are  more averse  to  risk  or  illiquidify  and
those  unabl€  to  rely  on others  in  an emergency would  have  a  larger
demand for  money,  imp1ying  positive  coefficients  on AVERSE,  EMER' ILLIQ,
and  SevMEo,  1.1 
.  AIso.  iacluded-were-.dumd-es  indicating  wheLher  the
household  did  not  save  (DONTSAVE),  used  professional  advice  on
investment B  (SOPH), and owned a  home (OWNHOME),  all  coded ae  1if  yes.
Demoqraphic Variables
These included marital  statrs  (MIRR=1, if  narried),  sex  of
if  nale) r  log  of  household size  (LHSIZE)  '  age of household  head  (SEx=1,
household head  (e.  g.,
if  did  not  attend  high
school;  and COII,EGE=I,
AGE3544l,  education  of  household  head  (NOHIGH=1.,
school;  HIGH=I,  if  only  graduated  from  high
if  graduated college)r16  and race  of  household
head  (RACE=0,  if  white),
3b,  Additional  Credit  Catd  variabJ.es
Tn the  probit  models  of  credit  card  o!{nership,  a  nunber
variables  from  the  money demand regressions  were  included.  Among
OI
these
were  the  log  of  income,  the  log  of  total  assets,  and
demographic  variables.l?  Income and tot.al  assets  rnay
associated  with  having  a  credit  card  not  only  because
most  of  the




media'  but  al-so because  such  households  are  mole  apt  to  meet the  credit
standards  used by  l€nders  in  approving  credlt  card  applications  or  in
15.  A positive  coefficient  on AVERSE  may also  reflect  an  increased
precautionary  motive  to  save  in  general,  partj-cularly  in  the  form  of
small  tine  deposits.
16.  Tfie omitted  group  are  those  with  only  some high  school  education.
L7.  Quadratic  log  terms  of  income and asseLs were statistically
insignificant  in  probits  not  reported  in  tables,-15-
preapproving  households  for  credit  cards.  (Por  similar  reasonsr  deno-
graphic  variables  may also  reflect  both  supply  and denand factors.)
Other  variables  were  included  in  the  probit  models  of  credit
card  ornership  to  pick  up other  factors  affecting  the  supply  of  or
demand for.  having  a.c.redit.  card'.  .On  tha  -demand  sider-  a'dunmy  variable
was included  to  control  for  household  attitudes  toward  using  debt.
This  variable  indicaled  whether  the  household  thought  that  usiflg  debt
was bad  (DEBTBAD),  coded as  L  if  yes.  AIso  included  wae a  dul[Ily
indicating  whether  the  household  lived  in  a  rural  area  (NONRURAI=1,  if
Iived  insj.de  of  an  SMSA),  ori  grounds  that  the  denand  for  transactions
rnedia in  rural  areas  may be  lower  than  elsenhere,  ceteris  paribus,
because  shopping  is  less  convenient  or  because  rural  households  may have
dif  fe!ent  preferences.
SeveraL  supply-side  variables  refJ-ecting  the  credit'tort,hiness
of  househotds  were  included  that  often  appear  on  credit  card  applica-
tj-ons  (some of  which  were  used by  Duca and Rosenthal  (1991)),  Among
these  were  dununies for  whether  the  household  had problens  repaying  debl
on tirne  (BADHIST), did  not  have a  credit  history  outside  of  a  credit
card  {NOHfSTORY)  r  and  received  pubLic  agsistance  (WELFARE},  all  coded as
1  if  yes,  tu 
stodi""  on the  qualily  of  consuner  loans  have  found  that
such  variables  are  significantly  related  to  the  probabiLity  of  loan
defaults  (e.9.,  Boyes, Hoffman, and Low (1989) and Orgler  (19?0))
Another  variabJ-e  used was the  log  of  median  county  family  income
(Ii4EDINC) on grounds  that  banks  often  target  promotional  efforts
preapproved  offers  of  cards  to  high  income areas,
in  i.9  82
1"8. Homeowners  with  rnortgages  were treated  as having a credit  history.-16-
A duncny (CONSTRAIN)  was included  t.hat  equaled  f. if  the
household  had either:  (1)  been denied  a  loan  or  received  a  smaller  than
desired  loan  during  the  pexiod  1980-1983  or  (2)  did  not  apPly  for  a  loan
because they  did  not  think  that  they  would  be  approved,re  Although  this
variable..  is--multj.col]Jinear-  with.  ather.  vaEi.ables  .ref J.ects:ing
creditworthiness,  as  suggesLed by  the  findings  of  Duca and Rosenthal
(1991),  including  it  may controL  for  additional  supply  factors  not
captured  by  the  other  variables,  In  particular.  CONSTRAIN  may tend  to
pick  up households  that  were  actually  turned  down for  credit  cards.  The
other  creditworthiness  variables  mav control  for  households  that  were
not.preapproved  for  credit  cards,  which  can be  important  insofar  as
preapproval-s  increase  the  demand for  credit  cards  by  reducing  the
shopping/transactions  costs  of  obtaining  credit  cards  from  the  point
view  of  households.20
4.  iesu-lts
since  what  determines  credit  card  and deposit  account  ownerehip
is  an  interesting  topie,  the  first  two  subsections  present  results  from
"short"  probit  models  of  credit  card  and account  ownership,  in  which
only  xelevant  r.h.s.  variables  are  included.  The last  two  subsections
present  money demand runs  which  incorporate  first  stage  re8ults  from
reduced  foflri  probit  models  that  include  all  the  e:rogenous variables.
4a,  Results  fron  the  Short  Prohit  Model  of  Havinq  a  Credit  Card
19.  Ncte:  for  those  indicating  the  source  of  information  that  led  them
to  believe  this,.  over  half  listed  lenders,  retailers,  or  credit  ratings.
?0.  Banks often  preapprove  households  based on  information  such  as
incomef  horneownership,  and a  householdrs  credit  history.
of-17-
The  short  probit  model  of  credit  card  ownership  performs
reasonably  welt  (see Table  1) .  First,  it  correctly  classified  78t  of
all  households,  88*  of  credit  card  holders,  and  60t  of  noncard  holders'
Second,  the  log-Likelihood  ratio  is  very  significant.
...Mo.sL  coeffieients  -.for  .th6.  eetilTra!€d  probabi.lit?  index  had  the
expected  signs  and were  significant.  The financial  advice,  income,  and
wealth  variables  were  positive  and very  significant,  Among  the
dernographic variables,  households  with  heads who were  over  65r  maler  or
who lived  in  rural  areas  were  significantly  less  likely  to  have  a  card,
whereas  households  with  heads who were marriedl  high  school  graduatesf
or  col.lege  graduates  were  significantly  more  likely  to  have  a  credit
card.  Household  size  was negatively  related  to  having  a  credit  card.
This  may reflect  the  fact  that  larger  householde  have  less  per  capita
income/rreaIth1  and  for  this  reasonf  may be  lees  likely  to  qualify  for
credit  cards  or  have  less  demand for  a  credit  card,
As to  variableB  more associated  with  the  supply  of  credit'
households  that  had no  credit  histories,  perceived  themselves  as
constrained,  or  received  welfare  benefits  were  significantly  less
to  have  credit  cards.  Having  a  bad  credit  history  was marginalJ-y
credit
J.ikely
significantf  but  was significant  in  runs  that  excluded  CONSTRAIN. These
resulis  suggest  that  lenders  use  credit  standards  based  on observable
characteristics  in  approving  credit  cards,  consistent  with  nscreening"
models of  credit  rationing  (e.9,,  Stiglitz  and weiss  (1981),  part  Iv) |
rather  than,  in  general-,  arbitrarily  approving  some observationally
equivalent  households  but  not  others  (as  in  Stiglitz  and Weiss  (1981) |
parts  fI  and  III)  .  These findings  ar:e consistent  with  the  loan  quality-18-
results  of  Boyesf Hoffman and I,ow (1988)r  Canner and Luckett  (1990)r  and
Orgler  (1970).  and with  results  about  who is  credit  constrained  obtained
by Duca and Rosenthal  (199L) and Jappe1li  (1990).21
4b.  Results  fron  Shott  Probit  ModeLs of  Deposit  Account, Ownersip
R"e.suLt.s  -from  r-shortn  -  pr-obit  modeLg o€  accounb  ownership  are
provided  in  Tables  2A and 28,  In  these  models,  the  same set  of  r.h.s.
variablee  were  used,  including  only  variabl-es  that  either  were
precautionary  in  nature  or  were  signifieant  for  at  least  one account
type  with  sensible  signs.22  Several  patterns  emerge across  the
different  types  of  accounts.  First,  several  socio-demographic  variables
are  ifiportant;  anong these,  households  with  heads who were  white,
female,  married,  coll-ege  or  high  school  educated  were  significantly  more
Iikely  to  have  accounts.  Second,  the  financially-related  variables  also
were  geaera]-Iy  significant  with  the  expected  signs.  Account  ownership
lcas positj-vely  related  to  using  financial  advice  (SoPH) and  levels  of
income  and assets,  but  negatively  related  to  household  size,  being
unemployed or  receiving  public  assist"n""."  Third,  the  probit  model
for  money fund/MMDA  account  ownership  does poorly  in  terms  of  correctly
predictj-ng  actual  account  statua  better  than  a  naive  prediction  that  no
one had  a money fund/MMDA  account.  ['oureh,  nany  preference  variables
were  insignificant.  Howeve!,  househoLds that  were  averse  to  being
21.  Using  a  data  from  the  Atlanta  areaf  Lindley,  Rudolph,  and Sel"by
{1989)  found  that  homeownership was significantly  related  to  having  a
creCit  cardr  but  their  data  did  not  include  other  supply-side  variablee,
22.  Opportunity  cost  terms  were  qener:ally  insignificant,  excepl  in  a
regression  of  checki-ng plus  money funds,  lrhere  the  opportunity  cost  term
haci  a  significan!,  but  positive  sign.  As discussed  ln  the  texl'  there
are  good reasons  to  di8count  opportunity  cost  findings  in  thiS  cross-
section  study.
23.  Quadratic  inco$e  and asaets  terns  were  insj.gnificant  in  other  runs.-19-
illiguid  were  l"ess likely  to  have  accounts;  this  may reflect  that  such
preferences  are  held  by  families  with  low  income/  ealbh.  Finallyt
coefficients  on the  age dunrnies,  which  are  not  sbown in  order  to
conserve  space,  generall-y  were  significant  and  indicated  that  the
.Likelihood  of -tlaving  an account  .teaded Eo increase-with  age,
4c.  ResuJ.ts  Concerning  Credit  CardB  and  Money Demand
Table  3  sunmarizeg  findings  on ?rhether credit  card  ownership
affects  money demand as  a  separate  variable  in  a  log-linear
specificat.ion  usinE  income  and assets  as  scale  variables.2a  The firgt
coliimn  reports  the  coefficientB  on  a Millts  ratio  term  from  a  credit
card  probit  model  that  was  entered  into  money  demand regressions  for  a
sartpl€  restricted  to  card  holders,  The signj-ficance  of  this  term  in
runs  for  deposj-ts  with  transactions  features  attests  to  a  non-zero
cova.ri.ance of  tbe  probit  and rnoney demand errors,  which  in  turn
indicates  that  a two-stage  approach  is  necessary  to  obtain  consistent
2+.-TEEluafitative  results  with  respect  to  PROBCARD  wexe qualibatively
sijnilar  in  other  runs  that  used  only  income as  a  scaLe variable,  with
the  exception  that  the  significance  of  PROBCARD  for  passbook  savings
fn1 1  in  ihc  Q0 n-rncnf  .onfidence  level.
Other  regressions  tested  whether  scale  elastlcities  differ  for  credit
card  hol-ders,  Although  interactive  terms  rdere significant  in  runs  using
income and  asgets,  the  signs  of  the  interactive  income  and wealth  terms
are  opposite  in  each  cage,  suggesting  that  a  bizarre  form  of
mult icollineaxity  anong the  four  scale  terms  fiIay be  creating  spurious
correLations.  In  runs  using  only  incorne or  assets  as  scale  variables,
the  scale  elasticities  are  somewhat higher.  with  the  difference  being
signifj-cant  -  lloweverf  the  model  that  Lends to  provide  the  best  fit
includes  lhe  logs  of  both  income  and assets  with  the  estinated
probability  of  having  a  credit  card  as  a  nonj-nteracted  variable,
fn  oth€r  tests,  the  observed  interest  elasticity  of  money demand is
significantl-y  and  substantially  different  for  credit  card  holders.
llowever'  for  each  definition  of  money, the  coefficient  on the  noninter-
acted  opportunity  cost  terms  was of  roughly  equal  magnitude,  but  of
opposite  sign.  This  result,  coupled  with  the  lack  of  much variation  in
the  opportunity  cost  terms  and time  series  evidence  on the  lagged  impact
of  opportunity  cost  changes on money holdings.  suggests  that  interest
rate  elasticity  estijnates  should  be viewed  vrith  a  grea!  deal  of  caution,-20-
parameter  estjmates,  The second  column
estimated  probability  of  having  a  credit
regressions.  The third  colulnn provides
the  incorrect  procedure  of  using  a  dununy
ownership  status  (CARD).
reports  coefficients  on the
card  (PROBCARD)  in  money demand
the  coefficients  obtalned  using
variable  for  credit  card
The estirated  pxobabitity  of  having  a  credit  caxd  (PROBCARD)  is
negaiively  and  significantly  associated  with  checking,  total  tran-
sactionsr  passbook  aaving,  and money fund  balances,  but  is  insignificant
for  small  time  deposits  and  for  total  household  M2 deposits.  This
finding  is  consistenL  with  the  view  that  credit  cards  enable  households
to  mj-nimi  ze transactions  deposits.  It  is  worLh noting  thaC  t,hese
qualitative  results  were  also  obtained  in  other  regressions  which
excluded  families  with  $1 million  in  income or  assets  and/or  which
exeLuded total  assets  as  a  scale  variable.  Notice  in  conparing  columns
2  and  3 that  CARD  is  qenerally  insignj-ficant  for  transactions-type
deposits  while  PROBCARD  is  significant.  This  difference  may reflect
simultaneity  bias  arising  from  the  endogeneity  of  money balances  and
credit  card  ownership.  AlternativelyT  this  reeult  may stem  from  the
exist€nce  of  omitled,  unobservable  variables  that  help  explain  rnoney
holdings  and  card  oidnership;  biased  estimates  can pJ.ausibly  arise  when a
credit  card  dunrny  is  us€d because househol-ds with  credit  cards  likely
have  a  higher  demand for  media  of  exchange,  and  thus  may hold  a  higher
level  of  balances  than  othernise  sittuilax  families  if  they  did  not  have-2r-
credit  cards  .25 In  this  wayf  our  study  suggests  that  Mandell's  (1972)
finding  that  a  dufiny for  card  ownership  had an  insignificant  (and
negative)  coefficient  in  regressions  of  demand deposit  balances  likely
reflected  a  selectivity  bias.  Indeed,  this  interpretation  is  suggeeted
by  MandeLli-r  linding.that  credit...car.d.hold6rs  in  "the .197{  SCF wrote  more
checks  than  noncard  holders  after  controlling  for  a  nunber  of  factors.
4d.  More Genetal  Money Demand  fiesults
Results  from  money demand runs
variables  are  presented  in  Tables  4A and
using  income  and assets  as  acale
48.25  Both  incorne and  asseEs
significantly  affect  money balances,  however defined,  except  that  income
is  insignificant  when assets  are  included  in  the  nontransaction  deposit
regression.  ?he  income  coefficienls  are  relatively  larger  for  the
transactions  components  (checking  and MMDA+MMW  deposits)  ,  whi.J-e  the
assei  coefficients  are  relativel-y  larger  for  the  savings  components
(passbook  savingis,  small  time,  and Mz-type  deposits).  This  pattern  is
consistent  with  the  vien  that  the  demand for  transactions  media  should
be  scaled  by  a  good proxy  for  spending,  while  the  demand for  savings
vehicl-es  should  be  gcaled  by  a  good proxy  for  totaf  aasets.  In
25.  Note  that  the  effect  of  having  a  credit  card  on  small  time  balances
changes from  being  negative  and  significant  using  a  credit  card  dununy  to
being  negative  and insignificant  using  the  fitted  probability.  This
resul-t  may ref],ect  that  credit  card  holders  rnay have  less  denand for
illiquid  savings  instrunents  within  M2 than  non  credit  card  holders
owingr to  unobservable  differences  in  preferences;  using  a  fitted
probability  in  place  of  duffny variable  corrects  for  this  problem.
25.  To conserve  spacef  resuLts  using  i.ncome as  the  only  scale  variable
are  provided  in  a  separat.e  appendixr  available  upon request  from  the
authors.  Most  of  these  results  are  similar  to  those  in  Tables  4A and
4Br with  two explainable  differences.  Fixst,  the  income coefficient  is
Iarger  and more  significantf  reflecting  some mult icollinearity  between
income and assets,  Second, the  age coefficients  are  larger  in  the
absence  of  assets.  likely  reflecting  that  the  age variables  likely  proxy
fot  the  accunulation  of  assets  over  the  li-fe  cvcle  in  these  runs.-22-
regressions  with  income  as  the  only  scale  varj-abI€,  the  estimated  income
elasticities  of  tranaactions  and M2 accounts  vrere near  unity.  This
result  is  broadly  consistent  vrith  Feige  (1964, 1974) and t,ee (1965),  who
found  that  the  income  elasticity  of  demand deposits  was not
significantly.  different.  from.1  i.rr an  era,ptior-to  deposi.t. deregulation.
The opportunity  cost  terms  are  insj-gnificant  for  each  of  the  four
deposit  cornponents and  for  M2-type  balancesr  but  are  significant  and
negative  for  the  transactions  deposit  aggregation.  For  reasons
mentioned  earlier,  these  estimates  ohou1d not  be viewed  as  definitlve
and  are only  presented  for  comp.Ieteness.
In  generaJ.,  the  precautionary  variables  (AVERSE,  SAI'I,IED|  and
UNEMPI,OY)  were  insignificant  i  one exception  was ILLIQT  which  tended  to
have  a  negative  sign.  By contrast,  the  savings  preference  variables,
DONTSAVE  and  O'INSOME  were  sj-gnificant  and  negative,  suggesting  that
overal.]  savings  preferences  affect  money demand and that  renters  partly
use money baLances  in  place  of  owner-occupied  housingr as  an allernative
form  of  holding  wealth.
In  general,  demographic  variables  were  significant.  Houeeholdg
headed by  males,  nonmarried  households,  and largrer  households  tended  to
have  lower  money balances  across  the  board,  vrhile  col-leqe  graduates
tended  to  hold  more transactions  balances  and  fewer  deposits  in  passbook
savings  accounts.  In  general,  younger  farnilies  had  smaller  money
holdings,  controlling  for  assets  and  incorne,  and  since  the  age  drmrnies
for  age groups  up to  65 vrere negativer  the  results  imply  that  farnilies
rqith  heads  aged 65 and over  had  larger  deposit  balances,  partj-cularly  in
nontransactions  deposits.  This  evidence  sugqests  that  life-cycle-23-
influences  affect.  the  demand for  different  deposits  and thus'  that
dernogiraphic shifts  nay  affect  the  aggregate  demand for  money.
Finally,  the  account  ownership  seLectj-on  or  inverse  lilill's
ratio  terms  (SEI,ECTION)  tend  to  be  negative,  indicating  that  households
with  a  grealer:tlran-predicted.  -propenaity-  !o  own a "parti€ular  type  of
account  have,  on averag:e,  larger  balances  in  that  type  of  account.
These selectivity  terms  were  significant  for  passbook  savings  and  snall
tifte  deposj-ts,  and  for  the  nontransact  ions,  liquid,  and M2 deposit
aggregations.  In  the  absence of  the  account  selectivity  terms,  resulta
from  regressions  not  reported  i.n table  form  dj-ffer  in  several  noteworthy
ways from  those  in  Tab1es 4A and  4B.  First,  the  estimated  income and
asset  elastities  are  bigger  for  money funds'  passbook  savingsl  and  small
tj$e  deposits,  whi.le  the  income  elasticity  for  the  sum of  savings  and
smal-l time  deposits  is  smaller,  Second,  tbe  estimaLed  nagnitude  of  the
coefficient  on PROBCARD  is  somewhat smaller  (but  still  significant)  for
checking  and money funds  separately,  but  somewhat larger  (and  still
significant)  for  the  sur  of  these  two  account  types.  Third,  the
coefficient  on PRoBCARD  for  passbook  savings  changes from  negative  and
significaflt  to  positive  and  significant  when the  account  selection  term
is  dropped,  This  is  the  only  instance  in  which  any  of  the  quafitative
results  with  respect  to  the  effect  of  credit  cards  on money demand was
different.  Neverthel-ess,  Lhe high  degree  of  signj-ficance  of  the  accounL
selection  term  in  the  passbook  savings  regression  indicates  that  the
regrression  in  Table  48 is  prefelab.Le.  and by  inplication,  that  credit
card  ownership  likely  lowers  passbook  sav.i-ngs  balances.  fn  sun,  theseresults  indicate  that  controlling  for  account  gelection  effects  is
j-fiporlant  in  cross-sect  ional.  work  on money demand.
5.  ConcLusion
This  study  sheds light  on  issues  relating  to  credit  card
owner$hip,. Jhe- effects  -of. credit...card  ownership  on hous€hold  dePosit
balances,  and the  determinants  of  deposj-t  account  ownership.  Results
indicate  that  both  demand and  supply  faclors  affect  who has  a  credit
card'  wit,h  household  attitudes  toward  using  debt  being  significant.  In
addition"  evidence  also  suggests  that  lenders  offer  ot  approve  credit
cards  using  credit  standards  based  on observable  characterislics  related
to  defauJ-t  risk,  consistent  with  oscreeningn  models  of  credit  rationing.
Results  indicate  that  credit  card  ownership  reduces  the  denand
fo!  transactions  deposits,  with  l-ittte  effect  on  snall  time  and total
deposits.  These findings  are  consistent  with  the  vievr  that  cxedi-t  card
use  can  help  rainimize  the  need for  deposits  that  serve  as  transactions
media .
This  study  contributes  to  the  money demand literature  in  two
other  nays.  firsL,  it  provides  cross-sectional  evidence  that  both
incofle  and  assets  are  significant  scale  variables  for  transactions
deposits,  but  that  incone  nay  not  be  an appropriate  scale  variable  for
srnall  tj.me deposits.  Second,  our  findings  indicate  that  controlling  for
selection  effects  can be  enpirically  important  for  croas-sectional
anaLvsis  of  monev demand.-25-
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I  Wrong Predictions:
toE  ti.kelihood
tikel"ihaod  Ratio:
(f  si.atistics  are  in






at  the  95t  Ievel  and **  at  the  998 level,
# Card Holders;  228f
nf  +haca  r1radi..fa.l  2017
# Without  Cards  L232
of  thFeA  rjl"e.ti  ?-f  ..t  144_  .  ?8-^-
IADIE  ZA
ResuLts from "Shortn  Probit  Models of  tiquid  Deposit Account OwnershiP
Money Fund  Passbook  MMMF+MMDA+
variables  Checkj,nq  e MMDA  Savings  Checkinq
constant  -3.2444**  -5.8740**  -2.31g0**  -3.4876**
(-7.60)  (-11.46)  (-6,84)  (-8.02)
LAssETs  0.!4'76**  0,2169**  0,0595*'t  0.1541**
(8.02)  (7  ,4rl  (3,66)  (8.30)
r,rNcol',tE  .  .,. 0.317g**  0'a4G5*.*  0..1915**  0.3416**
(6.  s5)  (4.33)  (4.91)  (5.94)
r,HsrzE  -0.193g**  -o.zli:rt'*  0.00g6  -0.?z!4**
l-2.761  (-4.  s2)  (0.15)  (-3.12)
uNEtyptor  -0.4207't"'  -0.L822  -0.210g*  -0.4099**
(-3.6e)  (-0.87)  (-2.00)  (-3.  s8)
tiutFARE  -0.5056**  -0.1886  -0.4060**  -0.4847**
(-s.  s3)  (-0.e4)  (-4.s9)  l-5,29\
ST{JDENT  1.445L**  0,3420  o  .2525  1,4699**
(3.48)  (0.88)  (0.95)  (3.  s2)
MARR  0,L249  0.0593  -0.0177  0.1310
(1,51)  (0.61)  (-0.26)  (1.57)
cort  0.6297**  0.4610**  -0.001?  0.63?9**
(s.69)  (3.8s)  (-0.21)  (s.62)
IirGH  0,3136**  0,0?97  0.2354**  0.3026**
(3.84)  (0.12)  (3.3s)  (3.66)
NoHrcH  -0.2556*  -0.0323  -O.1.42g  -0.2606'
(-2.60)  (-0.23)  (-1,641  F2.62',,
sopH  0.1630*  0.1680*  0,043?  0.2292**
12.251  (2.61)  (0.82)  (3.06)
NoNRURA1  -,0.:-322*  0.2227**  0.0995*  0.1285*
(-2.0e1  (3.08)  (1.  e6)  (2.00)
DoNTSAVE  -0.0823  -0,6812*  -0.  g147**  -0.0877**
(-o.  so)  (-1.95)  {-s.or)  (-s.29)
AVERSE  0.0903  0.25S4"  0.0173  0.0?34
(1.37)  (3.5?)  (0.33)  (1.l-0)
rr,Lre  -0.2148**  -0.24lf  -0.r244t'  -0.2083*'t
(-3.  r.1)  l-2.5e)  \-2.121  (-2.99)
EMER  0.0698  0,0191  0.0871  0.076't
(1.  r-8)  (0.31)  (1.86)  (1.28)
Coffect Predict.  84.3t  86.?8  68.7t  84.8&
EFRON  R-sq:  ,26L  **  .f79  **  .l-15  ** ,  .269  *,r
Likelihood Ratio  820,3  502.8  400,4  853.9
{AGE  variab}e  coefficients  are  omitted  from table  to  conserve space.)-29-
Table 28
"Short"  Probit  Results  for  NonTransactions
Snall  Savings +
Time  Small  Time
constant  -3.50?o*x  -2.  58  6  9**
(-8.031  (-7.s6)
LASSETS  0.2811**  0.1088**
(10.401  (6.56)
LrNColG  .  0..0?1.9  0.23?0**
(1.43)  (s.80)
r,HSrzE  -0.0821  -0.0568
(-1.08)  (-0.94)
UNEMPLOY  -0.2212  -0,!725
(-1.18)  (-1.61)
WELFARE  -0,5359*  -0.3755**
(-2.'1'1t  (-4.23)
STTJDENT  0.1467  0,2382
(0.37)  (1.01)
MARR  -0.1655*  -0.0528
(-1.90)  (-0.87)
col,r  0.0357  0.0283
(0.34)  (0.32)
HrcH  -0.o2"t4  0.2296*'
(-0.?91  (3.16)
NOHTGH  -0,1957  -0.2485**
(-1.69)  (-2  .7  9\
soPH  0,1018  0.0666
(1.68)  (1,1B)
NONRUR  AT  -0.1213'  0.0486
(-1.94)  (0.91)
DONTSAVE  -1,3838**  -0.9020**
(-3.11)  (-s.53)
AVERSE  g.r2g7*  0.021L
(2.03)  (0.38)
rT,rrQ  -0.8499*t'  -0.2240**
(-9.63)  (-3.74)
EMER  -0.0412  0.0881
(0.73)  (1.80)
Correct  Predict.  82.3t  '14,I*
ErRON  R-sgi  ,234  *rr  .161  **
likelihood  Ratio  850.6  l-03.6
(AGE  variable  coeffici-ents  are orlitted  from
and ltousehold  M2 Accounts
Liquid Household
Deposits  M2 Accts.
**  ,t*
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J.  ADIC  5
Impact  of  Credit  Cards  on  Money Demand
-.  EstjmaLed  Frobabilitl'
of  flaving  Card
. .  ,..Dunmy  for
































1.  The coefficients  are  from  regressions  that  include  both  income and
assets  as scale  variables.  Note that,  by constluction,  the  MiIl's  ratio
should  generally  have an  opposite  sign  than  that  of  PROB  or  CARD.
2.  These coefficients  are  on inverse  Mill's  ratio  terms  from  credit  card
probj.ts  and  from  money demand regressions  whicb  include  the  standard  seL
of  other  r.h.s.  variabLes  for  a  sampLe  restricted  to  account  and credit
carci holders  only.  The other  colunns  provide  coefficient  estinates  for
account  holders,  including  households  without  credit  cards.
*  denotes  sigmifj-cant  at  the  95t  level.
**  riFn^iFs  sionifinanf  :t  the  99t  level  .
Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses.
coefficients  on  selected  variables  from  regressj-ons  with  the  same set  of




































lable  4A:  Money Demand  Resul-ts  for  Transactions  and Passbook Deposits
Money  Fund  Passbook  MMW+!['{DA+
Variables  Checkinq  & MI,IDA  Savinqs  Checking



















-t.  I  LJ

























\2  .4't  I
0.318










(10.24)  (17.  ?0)
rt  *rt -0.883  0.890
(-2,L21  12.661
-u. zJL  -u. rJo
(-L.241  (-1.04)
































































0.190  0.106  0.036
(3.  s9)  (0.84)  (0.48)
S  oci o-Demogtaph  i c  var iab I e  s
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# Acct,  Owners  2862
(corrected  standard  errors  in
*--denotes  significant  at  the










Table  48:  Money Denand Resul"ts  for  Other  Deposits
Small  Savings  +  Liquid  Household
Time  Small  Time  Deposits  l,t2 Accts.
















































































































Opportunity  Cost  Variables
-0  .  L2'7
l-2  .6rl
P  recautionary  /Saving
(10.40)
-0.754












































































So  c  io -Defiogt aph  i c  Vat iab le s
Sunurarv Statistics
2

























in  parentheses  )
the  958 level .
the  99t  level ,


























(corrected  standard  errors
*--denotes  significant  at
x*--denotes  sj.gnificant  atTable  5
Definitions  of  Independe  t  Variables
Income and wealth  variables
TASSETS  =  1o9 of  household total  assets  in  1982 in  current  doIlars.
I,INCOME =  1og of  total  household  income  in  1982 in  current  dollars.
IMEDINC  =  1og of  the  median  L980 income  for  county  of  residence.
STUDENT  =  a dwnmy  equal  to  1 if  the  household  head was a  student  who
was not  employed.
UNEMP].OY  =  a  duruny equal  to  I  if  t,he  household  head  was  unemployedr  not
a  student,  and not  retired,
Savinqs  and Precautionarv  Demand  variabfes
AVERSE  :  a  dununy  equal  to  1  if  the  household  vrere not  willing  to  take
on  any  risk  in  investing  fanily  savings.
DEB?BAD =  a  dunmy equat  to  l- if  the  household  thinks  that  using  debt  is
a 'bad"  thing  to  do.
DOII1SAVE  :  a  dunnny equal  to  1  if  the  trousehold  does  nol  save.
IIII0  =  a  durnmy  equal  to  1  if  the  household  were  not  willing  to  tie
up any  family  savings  in  exchange  for  higher  asset  teturns.
SAVi.fiD  :  a  durmy equal  to  L  if  the  household's  fi.rst  or  second most
important  reason  to  save  is  for  medical  expenseg.
SOPS  =  a  durmuy  equal  to  1  if  the  household  relied  upon  some sort  of
professionaJ-  for  investment  advice.
Creditworthiness  and Debt  Preference  variables
BADIIIST  =  a  durmny  equal  to  1  if  the  household  had  problems  making  loan
r''evmenl-  <  ih  tha  15af  fhraA  var.<
CONStFAlli :  a  dutrny equal  to  l- if  in  the  past  3 years  a  household
eittler:
a)  was denied  a  loan  or  offered  a  loan  smaller  than  it  desj-red
and did  not  successfully  reapply  for  a  loan  at  another  lender,
b)  thought  about  applying  but  did  not  because  it  thought  that
it  would  not  get  the  loan,  (Note:  for  those  indicating  the
source  of  information  that  lead  them to  beLieve  t.hi-s,  over  half
indicated  lenders.  retailers.  or  credit  ratinqs.
orDEBTBTD =  a  dumy  equal  to  L  if  the  household  views  buyj-ng items  with
instal-lment  credit  as  a  ibadn  thing.
NOSISIORY=  a  dr:nmy  equal  to  L  if  the  household  has  no  credit  history
other  than  having  a  credit  card.
OWNHOI'iE  :  a  durEny equal  to  1  if  the  household  owns  a  home.
WELFAIE  :  a  duIr[rlr equal  to  1  if  the  househofd  received  public
assistance  in  1982,
Demoqraphic Variables
AGE24  =  a  dur|trr{f  equat  to  L  if  head's  age is  less  than  25.
AGE2534 = a dumny  equal  to  1if  head's  age is  between 25 and 34.
AGE3544  =  a  durm&y  equal  to  L  if  head's  age  is  between  35 and  44.
ACE4554 = a dunny equal  to  1if  head's  age is  betyreen  45 and 54.
AGE5564 = a riumny  egual, to  1if  head,s age is  between 55 and 64.
CO],l  =  a  d'::nmy  equal  to  L  if  the  head graduated  from  college.
HIGH  =  a  durcny equal  to  1  if  the  head only  finished  high  school,
NOiilGi{  =  a  duarny equal  to  L  if  the  head  did  not  attend  high  school
LHSTZE  =  1og of  the  number of  people  in  the  household.
MARR  -  a  du$ny variable  equal  to  1  if  narried.
NONRURAL  :  a  durEny variable  equal  to  1  if  does  not  live  in  an  SMSA.
RACE  =  a  dwrny  equal  to  l- if  the  household  head is  nonwhite,
SEX  =  a dumy  variable  equal  to  1  if  t.he household  head is  male.
t'-37-
Appendix  Table  A:  Money Demand  Results  for




Constant,  SeJ"ectivity  Bias,  and
*r(
Constant  5.364  5.710
.  (1.9s)  (2.57  |
)t*  rt
PROBCARD  -0.816  -1 .549
(-2.81  (-2,54t











































(-4  .  81)
0.188
(2  ,  40)
0,053
(0.61-)
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(-9,44)
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0.778
(6.38)
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(corrected  standard  errors  in  parenlheses)
*--denotes  significant  at  the  95t  level.
**--denotes  significant  at  the  99t  leve].-3  9-
Appendix  Table  Bi  ResuJ-ts for  Other  Deposits
With  fncome As the  OnIv  Scale  Variable
Snall  Savings  +  tiquid  Household
Time  Srnall  Time  Deposits  M2 AcctE.







(4.  sr.  )
-0.540
(-1.29)














7,9L8  .0.153  0.438
(8.44)  10.21t  (0.78)
-r..518  0.460  0.136
(-4.32',t  (r-.  63)  (-0.46)
)t tr  *  *)k -3,864  -0.  596  -0.933
(-1-0  .  16  )  (-?  ,521  \-3  .2',l',)
S  c  ale  /Enp 7 oyme  nt  vari  abl"e  s













Opportvnity  Cost  Variables
*t( -3.408  -0,L29  -0.002  0  ,042
(-2.231  (-2.  s0)  (-0.04)  (0.46)
P  recaut  i onar  y  / Sav  i ng Vari able  s
0.050  -0.014  -0.133  -0.065
(0.s2)  (-0.18)  (-2.L2l  (-0.97)
*:t  **  *)t
t.'137  0.432  -1.106  -I .247
(4.49)  (0,  e7)  (-4.91)  {-5.  r.4)
-0.oog  -0.209*"  o.oo4  -o.o2s
(-0.09)  (-2  .gL't  (0.07)  (0.43)
*  ta*  **
0.511  -0.163  -0,334  -0.606
(1.84)  (-1.  sr)  (-4.  60)  (-7.94)
,t*  **  ** -0.229  -0,026  0,288  0.461
(-1  .43)  (-0.22)  (-3.  94)  (-5.95)
-0.032  0.04s  0.07r.  -0.05?
{-0.2s)  (0.46)  (0,88)  (-0.68)-40-
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(correct€d  standard  errors  in  parentheses)
*--denoLes  significant  at  the  95t  leveL.
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